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Summary 
The prominent use of international human rights law in a state’s domestic
legal system depends on the hierarchical place occupied by international
law in general, and international human rights law in particular, among
the sources of law in that particular legal system. Two systems of receipt of
international law in the domestic legal systems have been used by
different states: monism, which looks to directly incorporate ratified
international law treaties in a state’s domestic legal system; and dualism,
which entails the transformation of international law into the domestic
legal system through the domestication of ratified international law
treaties by means of the enactment of parliamentary legislation. Kenya, as
a Commonwealth country, has always primarily followed a dualist
approach which requires that domesticating legislation be enacted by
parliament for ratified international law treaties to have application in the
domestic legal system. However, with the promulgation of the new
Constitution in August 2010, international law has been given a more
prominent role in the domestic legal system through the inclusion in the
Constitution of a provision directly incorporating ratified treaty law into
the Kenyan legal system as a legitimate source of law. This article is
primarily focused on analysing the hierarchical place of international law,
specifically international human rights treaty law, in the Kenyan domestic
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legal system in the context of the new constitutional dispensation. It
recommends that in order for international human rights law to have a
prominent place in the governance of the country, article 2(6) of the
Constitution should be interpreted progressively so as to give international
human rights law norms an infra-constitutional but a supra-legal status in
the domestic legal system. In this way, international human rights law will
act as a bulwark against recession to totalitarian rule, as well as safeguard
the democratic and fundamental rights protection gains that were won in
the struggle for constitutional change.
1 Introduction
International law, specifically international human rights law, has had
an unenviable history in the Kenyan domestic legal system.1 The 1963
Independence Constitution did not provide for its direct application in
the Kenyan legal system, with Kenya, similarly to other common law
countries, adopting a dualist approach to international law.2 With the
adoption of the dualist approach, Kenya espoused the doctrine of
transformation, which envisioned that international law could only be
applicable in the domestic legal system if it had been domesticated by
parliamentary legislation.3 The doctrine of transformation meant that,
hierarchically speaking, ratified international treaties, once
1 This article is primarily focused on international human rights law because of its
sui generis nature of aiming to afford practical and effective protection to
individuals and groups who are not parties to the relevant international
instruments. The import of this article is, therefore, to make recommendations for
the purposive interpretation of art 2(6) of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution so as to
achieve the practical and effective protection of individuals and groups, the
purpose and objective of international human rights law. 
2 F Viljoen International human rights law in Africa (2012) 522; M Killander &
H Adjolohoun ‘Introduction’ in M Killander (ed) International law and domestic
human rights litigation in Africa (2010) 3 11. Dualism envisages the complete
separation of national and international legal systems, and that for rules of
international law to apply in the national legal system, they must be transformed,
through domestication, and thus apply as part of domestic national law and not
as international law. Monism, on the other hand, envisages international law and
national law as part of one legal system, and that international law is directly
incorporated into the national legal system without any difficulty in its application
as international law within the domestic legal system. For a more elaborate
analysis of monism and dualism, see TM Frank & AR Thiruvengadam ‘International
law and constitution making’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 470;
WM Gibson ‘International law and Colombian constitutionalism: A note on
monism’ (1942) 36 The American Journal of International Law 614; G Slyz
‘International law in national courts’ (1995-1996) New York Journal of International
Law and Politics 65 67.
3 See JO Ambani ‘Navigating past the “dualist doctrine”: The case for progressive
jurisprudence on the application of international human rights norms in Kenya’ in
Killander (n 2 above) 26. The doctrine of transformation was aptly captured by
Justice Atkin in the case of Commercial and Estates Co of Egypt v Board of Trade
[1925] 1 KB 271, 295 where he stated: ‘International law as such can offer no
right cognisable in the municipal courts. It is only in so far as the rules of
international law are recognised as included in the rules of municipal law that they
are allowed in municipal courts to give rise to rights and obligations.’
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domesticated, only had application in the domestic legal system at
the same level as other domestic legislation, and they could be
amended by a simple legislative majority.4 This indifferent treatment
of international law was replicated in the Kenyan Judicature Act
which, in enumerating Kenya’s sources of law, did not earmark it as a
source of law in Kenya’s domestic legal system.5 The situation had
been exacerbated by the poor domestication practice of the Kenyan
legislature, with most of the ratified treaties having had no force of
law in Kenya due to the absence of domesticating legislation. 
Due to this lacuna, the Kenyan courts had developed an
inconsistent practice in relation to international law, with the courts
generally shying away from directly applying international law.6 The
prevailing judicial position on the applicability of international law in
the Kenyan domestic legal system prior to the enactment of the 2010
Constitution was established in the case of Rono v Rono & Another by
the Court of Appeal, then the highest court in the country.7 In this
case, the Court affirmed that as a member of the international
community, Kenya subscribed to international customary law and
ratified international treaties.8 It acknowledged the long-standing
debate on the applicability of international law in the Kenyan
domestic legal system, and affirmed that ‘Kenya subscribes to the
common law view that international law is only part of domestic law
4 See Frank & Thiruvengadam (n 2 above) 477 483 485, who affirm this equal
hierarchal status of ratified and domesticated treaties vis-à-vis domestic legislation
in a dualist system in their discussion of the prevailing situation in Italy, the United
Kingdom and India respectively. See also Ambani (n 3 above) 30, who is of the
opinion that prior to the enactment of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution,
international law was hierarchically lower in rank than both the Constitution and
domestic legislation in the Kenyan domestic legal system. This, however, could
not have been the case with domesticated treaties, as the domesticating
legislation had equal hierarchical status to any other parliamentary legislation and
could only be overridden by subsequent legislation. 
5 The Judicature Act of Kenya, Cap 8 (Revised Edition 2007 (2003)) http://
www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/GreyBook/3.%20Judicature%20Act.pdf (accessed
22 April 2013), which in sec 3 enumerates sources of law in Kenya as the
Constitution, Acts of Parliament, the common law, doctrines of equity, the statutes
of general application, and African customary law so long as it is not repugnant to
justice and morality or inconsistent with any written law.
6 This judicial attitude is exemplified by the case of Okunda v Republic [1970] EA
512, where the High Court held that since international law was not included in
the Judicature Act as a source of law in Kenya, it did not have any legal force in
the domestic legal system. In the High Court case of Pattni & Another v Republic
[2001] KLR 262, the Court similarly held that even though international law
norms could have persuasive value and that the courts could take account of
relevant international law values in adjudication, they were not binding sources of
law in the Kenyan domestic jurisdiction unless they were transformed into Kenyan
law by the Constitution or other written law. 
7 Mary Rono v Jane and William Rono, Court of Appeal at Eldoret, Civil Appeal 66 of
2002, 29 April 2005 (Rono v Rono).
8 Paras 19-20 Rono v Rono (n 7 above).
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where it has been specifically incorporated’.9 Despite this dualist
position, the Court went on to hold as follows:10
However, the current thinking on the common law theory is that both
international customary law and treaty law can be applied by state courts
where there is no conflict with existing state law, even in the absence of
implementing legislation.
In reaching its decision, the Court foreshadowed the impending
change in the situation of international law in the Kenyan domestic
legal system through the adoption of a new constitutional
dispensation by pointing to the then Draft Constitution of Kenya
which clearly provided for international customary and treaty law to
form part of the laws of Kenya.11 The Court then proceeded to make
its finding by relying on both national law and relevant ratified
international human rights law, especially the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), even when it had not been domesticated by
Kenya.12
However, with the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, with a
provision envisaging the direct application of international law as
contained in ratified treaties, the place of international law in the
Kenyan domestic legal system has shifted significantly. The challenge
facing Kenyan courts at the moment, and which is the main focus of
this article, is how this constitutional provision directly incorporating
international law norms in ratified treaties in the Kenyan domestic
legal system should be interpreted, especially in relation to ratified
international human rights treaties, and the hierarchical status that
should be given to international human rights norms contained in
ratified treaties in Kenya. After this brief introduction, the article in
part 2 undertakes an analysis of the prevailing treatment of
international human rights law in the Kenyan domestic legal system
after the promulgation of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. Parts 3 and
4 of the article delve into a comparative analysis of the interpretation
of constitutional provisions directly incorporating international law
into domestic law in two jurisdictions: the United States of America
and Colombia respectively. These two jurisdictions are chosen
because, even though both have constitutional provisions directly
9 Para 21 Rono v Rono.
10 As above. In its decision, the Court relied on Principle 7 of the Bangalore Principles
on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms which states as
follows: ‘It is within the proper nature of the judicial process and well-established
judicial functions for national courts to have regard to international obligations
which a country undertakes – whether or not they have been incorporated into
domestic law – for the purpose of removing ambiguity or uncertainty from
national constitutions, legislation or common law.’
11 Para 23 Rono v Rono.
12 Para 24 Rono v Rono. See also Viljoen (n 2 above) 525. The position in Rono v Rono
has been affirmed and followed by the Kenyan Courts in subsequent cases such as
Re The Estate of Lerionka Ole Ntutu (Deceased) (2008) eKLR and Rose Moraa &
Another v The Attorney-General (2006) eKLR. 
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incorporating international law into their domestic legal systems, they
have adopted differing approaches to the interpretation of these
constitutional provisions, with the result that the hierarchical place of
international law in the two comparative systems are also different.
The United States has, over the years, restricted the direct
incorporation and use of international human rights law in its
domestic jurisdiction using the self- and non-self-executing doctrine,
while Colombia has continued a practice of direct incorporation of
international human rights law and the reliance on international
human rights standards to enhance the national protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms. The comparative study of these two
jurisdictions is thus intended to indicate the two alternative
approaches that can be adopted in the interpretation of article 2(6) of
the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, and the effects that a choice of any of
the alternative interpretations will have on the hierarchical place of
international human rights law in the Kenyan domestic legal system
and, consequently, the protective value of international human rights
norms in Kenya. Part 5 entails a proposal regarding the hierarchical
status that international human rights law should be accorded in the
Kenyan domestic legal system, if the objective of the drafters of the
Constitution that international human rights law should play a
prominent role in governance in Kenya, is to be realised. Part 6
contains a short conclusion. 
2 Place of international human rights treaty law in 
Kenya’s domestic legal system after the 
promulgation of the 2010 Constitution
The promulgation in August 2010 of the new Kenyan Constitution has
radically changed the position of international human rights law in the
Kenyan domestic legal system, as discussed above. With the
promulgation, international human rights law in ratified treaties have
been directly incorporated into the Kenyan domestic legal system
through article 2(6)13 of the Constitution.14 The entrenchment of the
13 Art 2(6) provides that ‘[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part
of the law of Kenya under this Constitution’. This provision has similarities with art
144 of the 1990 Namibian Constitution which provides that ‘[u]nless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules of public
international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this
Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia’. For an interpretation of art
144 of the 1990 Namibian Constitution, see O Tshosha ‘The status of international
law in Namibian national law: A critical appraisal of the constitutional strategy’
(2010) 2 Namibia Law Journal 11. Tshosha contends that the inclusion of the
clause directly incorporating international law in the Namibian domestic
jurisdiction effectively accords international law a constitutional status in Namibia.
14 The practice of directly incorporating international law into the domestic legal
system in art 2(6) of the Kenyan Constitution is comparatively similar to the 1991
Colombian Constitution, art 93, which provides that international human rights
treaties ratified by Colombia take precedence over domestic law. See M Sepulveda
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primacy of international human rights law into the Kenyan legal
system, a system that has been plagued by almost four decades of
totalitarian rule, is not a strangely Kenyan phenomenon, but has been
witnessed worldwide, and is based on the importance of a
commitment to international human rights protective values at the
highest level possible with the hope of non-regression to totalitarian
rule.15
The change in the reception of international law in the Kenyan
legal system from transformation to incorporation was confirmed by
Justice Martha Koome in the High Court case of Re The Matter of
Zipporah Wambui Mathara,16 concerning article 11 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). She held
that article 2(6) imported the provisions of international treaties and
conventions that Kenya has ratified into Kenyan law as part of the
sources of Kenyan law.17 This was similarly affirmed in the High Court
case of Beatrice Wanjiku & Another v The Attorney-General & Another,18
where the Court stated as follows:
Before the promulgation of the Constitution, Kenya took a dualist
approach to the application of international law. A treaty or international
convention which Kenya had ratified would only apply nationally if
parliament domesticated the particular treaty or convention by passing the
relevant legislation. The Constitution and in particular articles 2(5) and 2(6)
gave new colour to the relationship between international law and
international instruments and national law.
14 ‘The Constitutional Court’s role in addressing social injustice’ in M Langford (ed)
Social rights jurisprudence: Emerging trends in international and comparative law
(2008) 145-146. Similarly, art 15(4) of the the Russian Constitution of
12 December 1993, article 15(4) incorporates international law into the Russian
legal system by providing that ‘[t]he commonly recognised principles and norms
of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a
competent part of its legal system. If an international treaty ... stipulates other
rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty shall
apply’. Similar provisions are also included in the new East European states’
Constitutions, such as Estonia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan,
Turkmenistan, Moldova and Belarus. See VS Vereshtin ‘New constitutions and the
old problem of the relationship between international law and national law’
(1996) 7 European Journal of International Law 34; A Peters ‘Supremacy lost:
International law meets domestic constitutional law’ (2009) 3 International
Constitutional Law Journal 171; GM Danilenko ‘Implementation of international
law in CIS states: Theory and practice’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International
Law 52-53.
15 Vereshtin (n 14 above) 29-30; GL Neuman ‘The use of international law in
constitutional interpretation’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 85.
16 David Ndungo Maina v Zipporah Wambui Mathara, Bankruptcy Cause 19 of 2010,
http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/77605.pdf (accessed 8 October 2011).
17 n 16 above 4. See also John Kabui Mwai & 3 Others v Kenya National Examination
Council & 2 Others, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition 15 of 2011 6-7; and
Ibrahim Songor Osman v Attorney General & 3 Others, High Court Constitutional
Petition 2 of 2011 8-10, where the High Court affirmed that, since Kenya has
ratified ICESCR, it has become part of Kenyan law by dint of art 2(6) of the
Constitution. 
18 High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition 190 of 2011 para 17. 
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Further affirmation of the changed situation in relation to the
applicability of international law in Kenya after the promulgation of
the 2010 Constitution was provided by the Kenyan Court of Appeal in
the case of David Njoroge Macharia v Republic,19 and by the Supreme
Court of Kenya in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Willy
Mutunga in the One-Third Gender Representation Advisory Opinion
as follows:20
From article 27, and from CEDAW, it is clear that disenfranchisement of the
Kenyan women in the political arena is a form of discrimination. CEDAW
applies through the operation of Article 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya,
having been acceded to by Kenya on 9th March 1984. These provisions
collectively call for the immediate removal of this discrimination through
the empowerment of women representation in political office, with
CEDAW calling for stop-gap measures to be put in place to reverse the
negative effects on our society through the operation of this systemic
discrimination.
This direct incorporation of international human rights law into the
domestic legal system, as per the 2010 Constitution, is in line with the
prevailing jurisprudence of international treaty bodies such as the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR
Committee) which, in General Comment 9, has recommended to
member states the immediate and direct application of binding
international human rights instruments in the domestic legal systems
of states so as to enhance the ability of individuals to seek effective,
accessible, affordable and timely enforcement of their rights in
domestic courts and tribunals.21
However, progressive as it may seem, the change in the system of
applicability of international law from a system of transformation to a
system of incorporation portends great challenges in the
implementation of the 2010 Constitution. The lack of clear
constitutional safeguards in relation to the interpretation and
operationalisation of article 2(6), coupled with the lack of a clear
constitutionally-entrenched role for parliament in the treaty-adoption
process,22 raises concerns about the limitation of Kenya’s sovereignty
19 Criminal Appeal 497 of 2007 15, http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/
81236.pdf (accessed 23 June 2013). See also CEDAW Committee Concluding
Observation to Kenya’s 7th Periodic Report, 5 April 2011 para 4, where the
Committee contends that the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution ensured the
immediate domestication of the Convention.
20 In the Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation in the National Assembly and
the Senate, Supreme Court of Kenya, Advisory Opinion Application 2 of 2012
Dissenting Advisory Opinion of Chief Justice Willy Mutunga, para 11.1. The
opinion of the Chief Justice is in line with the arguments made by the parties in
the case, especially the Centre for Multi-Party Democracy, Kenya Human Rights
Commission and Federation of Women Lawyers-Kenya, that by dint of art 2(6) of
the Constitution, CEDAW has constitutional force in Kenya; paras 5.7-5.8.
21 CESCR General Comment 9: The domestic application of the Covenant,
3 December 1998, E/C 12/1998/24 para 4, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/47a7079d6.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 
22 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, in art 94(1), vests the legislative authority of the
state in parliament, and further provides in sub-art 5 that no person or body has
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vis-à-vis international law.23 These concerns are, however, too broad
to be adequately and comprehensively discussed in this article. The
main concern of this article is the hierachy or place of international
human rights law in ratified international treaties in relation to other
sources of law in the Kenyan domestic legal system. To respond to
this main concern, a brief analysis of a few of the jurisdictions with
provisions incorporating international law into their domestic legal
system is imperative.
3 International law in the United States domestic legal 
system
The supremacy of international law in the domestic legal system of
the United States (US) was affirmed as early as 1804 when the then
Chief Justice Marshall, in his interpretation of article VI of the US
Constitution,24 held that ‘[a]n act of congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains’.25 This was affirmed by the US Supreme Court
in 1895 and 1900 when it held that ‘[i]nternational law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
22 the power to make law in Kenya, except under authority conferred by the
Constitution or legislation. The Kenyan Constitution and the prevailing practice,
unlike in the United States and in Colombia, does not require the approval of
parliament as a condition precedent before the executive ratifies a treaty, and thus
direct application of treaties as law in the Kenyan domestic jurisdiction will be
tantamount to legislation by the executive. However, a new law, The Treaty-
Making and Ratification Act 45 of 2012, has been developed with a view to
plugging this gap, as is discussed more elaborately in sec 5 below.
23 Gibson (n 2 above) 614; Slyz (n 2 above) 67, who argues that in monist states,
legislatures are circumscribed by international law requirements when making
decisions, the executive is obliged to ensure that international law obligations are
faithfully realised, and the courts must take into account and give effect to
international law in their decisions. A further argument against direct
incorporation of international law principles (customary international law) is that
such incorporation interferes with democratic governance as no democratically-
elected institution evaluates their desirability and acts affirmatively to adopt them.
See PR Dubinsky ‘International law in the legal system of the United States’ (2010)
58 American Journal of Comparative Law 464. This cautious approach towards the
incorporation of recent international law customs, especially modern international
human rights law, was affirmed in 2004 by the US Supreme Court in Sosa v
Alvarez Machain 542 US 692 (2004).
24 Art VI of the US Constitution provides that ‘[a]ll treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding’. See the
Constitution of the United States, http://constitutioncenter.org/6338766960
43236250.pdf (accessed 5 April 2013). 
25 Murray v The Schooner Charming Betsy 6 US (2 Cranch) 64 118 (1804), quoted in
H Hongju-Koh ‘International law as part of our law’ (2004) 98 American Journal of
International Law 44.
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justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination’.26
However, international law jurisprudence in US courts has
progressively shifted towards a nationalist leaning.27 Three reasons
have been given for this nationalist shift: first, the perceived different
nature of international law from, and its potentially pervasive effects
on, domestic law; second, the perception that fundamental tenets of
the domestic legal order, as enshrined in the Constitution, cannot be
altered by a body of law which does not exclusively emanate from a
national societal body;28 and, third, an understanding of constitutions
as emerging from, espousing and responding to a nation’s particular
history and traditions.29 This shift has led to the development of the
doctrine of self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. The
doctrine commenced with the decision of Chief Justice Marshall in the
case of Forser & Elam v Neilson,30 where he held as follows: 
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is
consequently to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of
the Legislature whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act,
the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the Judicial Department, and
the Legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for
the Court.
Following on this holding of Chief Justice Marshall, the US courts
proceeded to develop criteria for the determination of the self-
executing nature of a treaty, which included the following: the
purpose of the treaty and the objective of its creators; the
circumstances surrounding its execution; the nature of obligations
imposed by the agreement; the existence of domestic procedures and
institutions appropriate for direct implementation; the availability and
feasibility of alternative enforcement methods; and the immediate and
26 See Hilton v Guyot 159 US 113 (1895); The Paquete Habana 175 US 677 (1900)
700, quoted in Hongju-Koh (n 25 above) 43. See also XF Torrijo ‘International and
domestic law: Definitely an odd couple’ (2008) 77 Revista Juridica Universidad de
Puerto Rico 485, who affirms that the supremacy clause in the US Constitution
allows for the direct incorporation of ratified treaties, making them applicable, in
principle, by national courts.
27 A Bianchi ‘International law and US courts: The myth of Lohengrin revisited’
(2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 754; Frank & Thiruvengadam (n 2
above) 471. 
28 As above.
29 S Choudhry ‘Globalisation in search of justification: Towards a theory of
comparative constitutional interpretation’ (1999) 74 Indiana Law Journal 822, who
expounds on the doctrine of ‘legal particularism’ and ‘legal hegemony’ as some of
the interpretive attitudes militating against the use of international law in the
interpretation of constitutional provisions in the US, 830-832.
30 27 US (2 Pet) 253 (1829) 314. For a discussion of the development of this
doctrine, see Slyz (n 2 above) 78-80; D Sloss ‘Non-self-executing treaties:
Exposing a constitutional fallacy’ (2002) 36 University of California Davis Law
Review 1.
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long-term implications of self- or non-self-execution.31 These criteria
were reaffirmed in the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the US, which provided the following three conditions, any of
which makes a treaty non-self-executing: if it manifests an intention
not to be an effective domestic law without implementing legislation;
if Congress or the Senate requires implementing legislation; or if the
Constitution requires implementing legislation.32 
The development of the doctrine of self-executing treaties signified
that for non-self-executing treaty provisions to provide concrete
litigable rights to individuals, the US Congress must pass
implementing legislation.33 The US Supreme Court, faced with the
question of the status of article 94 of the UN Charter and as a
consequence the status of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s
decision in the Avena case,34 decided in Medellin v Texas (2008)35 that
the Avena decision was not self-executing within the US legal system.
The Court, in a six-to-three decision, held as follows:36
An ICJ judgment creates legal obligations for the United States under
public international law and should be accorded ‘respectful consideration’
within the US domestic legal system, but is not to be accorded the status of
binding law to be applied by US courts in the absence of either
implementing legislation or an intent, clearly expressed in the treaty text,
for the provision at issue to be incorporated into US law without action by
Congress.
Slyz contends that this is a prudent way of avoiding the question of
the supremacy of one system of law over the other, as they do not
share a common field of application.37 Bianchi, however, disagrees,
contending that it detracts from, and waters down, the intended
protection envisaged by international human rights and humanitarian
law, as was exemplified by the lack of international law protection
given to Guantanamo Bay detainees in the context of the so-called
war on terror.38
31 See People of Saipan v United States Department of the Interior 502 F2d 90 (9th Cir
1974); and Frolova v USSR 761 F2d 370 (7th Cir 1985).
32 For a more elaborate discussion of the criteria for the determination of the self-
executing or non-self-executing nature of a treaty in the US, see Slyz (n 2 above)
78-80; Frank & Thiruvengadam (n 2 above) 472-474.
33 Slyz (n 2 above) 67-68 78. He gives the example of the US Genocide Convention
Implementation Act of 1987 secs 1091-1093, which proscribe the statute from
creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in
any proceedings; 68 fn 15.
34 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of
America), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8190.pdf (accessed 12 April
2013).
35 552 US 491 (2008).
36 Dubinsky (n 23 above) 461.
37 Slyz (n 2 above) 68.
38 Bianchi (n 27 above) 758. He cites the case of Hamdi v Rumsfeld, where the 4th
Circuit Court held that the Geneva Convention III on Prisoners of War was non-
self-executing and could not create enforceable private rights of action in US
domestic courts, 764. 
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On the place of international law in relation to the Constitution and
domestic legislation, the US Constitution is the supreme law of the
land, and envisages that human rights treaty law provisions
inconsistent with the Constitution will not have the force of law in the
US.39 On the relationship between federal statutes and international
law, the US courts, on the basis of the supremacy of the Constitution,
have held that federal statutes and self-executing treaty provisions
have equal status as sources of domestic law.40 Therefore, in case of a
conflict between them, the courts have used the ‘last-in-time’ doctrine
to hold the validity of the subsequent instrument, be it the treaty or
the statute.41 The similarity in hierarchy between self-executing
treaties and domestic statutes in the US was aptly captured in the case
of Whitney v Robertson,42 where the Supreme Court held as follows:
By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of
like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that
instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is
given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject,
the courts will always endeavour to construe them so as to give effect to
both, if that can be done without violating the language of either; but, if
the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other:
provided, always, the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-
executing.
A reading of article 2(6) to infuse this type of interpretation in the
Kenyan jurisdiction is possible, taking into account article 21(4) of the
2010 Constitution which calls on the state – that is parliament and the
executive respectively – to enact and to implement legislation aimed
at fulfilling its international human rights obligations.
An interpretation placing international human rights norms in
ratified international human rights treaties at the same hierarchical
level as national legislation was adopted in the Kenyan High Court
case of Diamond Trust Kenya Ltd v Daniel Mwema Mulwa,43 a case
39 Bianchi (n 27 above) 780. This position was espoused as early as 1957 in Reid v
Covert 354 US 1 16-17 (1957), where the Supreme Court stated as follows: ‘[N]o
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on congress, or any other
branch of government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution … The
prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the
national government and they cannot be nullified by the executive or the
executive and the senate combined.’
40 Slyz (n 2 above) 84; Dubinsky (n 23 above) 458.
41 DL Sloss et al (eds) International law in the US Supreme Court: Continuity and
change (2011) 58. However, to minimise congressional abuse of the ‘last-in-time
doctrine’, US courts have purposed to construe statutes so as not to conflict with
international law and have strived to reconcile subsequent statutes with
international law (the Charming Betsy rule of statutory construction). Thus, in
United States v Palestinian Liberation Organisation 695 F Supp 1456 (SDNY 1988),
the Court held that ‘in order for a subsequent statute to supersede a treaty, the
explicit purpose of the statute must be to supersede the treaty’ (1459). See also
Bianchi (n 27 above) 761-763.
42 124 US 190 (1887).
43 (2010) eKLR, quoted in Beatrice Wanjiku & Another v The Attorney-General (n 18
above) para 16.
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which concerned the constitutionality of a provision of the Civil
Procedure Act of Kenya which permitted the comital of a judgment
debtor to civil jail contrary to article 11 of ICCPR, which was
incorporated into Kenyan law through article 2(6) of the Constitution.
In dealing with the issue of the hierarchy of international human
rights norms in ratified international human rights instruments vis-à-
vis national legislation, the Court held as follows: 
We have in this country a three tier hierarchy of the law. At the apex is the
Constitution of Kenya, which is the supreme law of the land, to which all
other laws are subservient. Next in rank are Acts of Parliament, followed by
subsidiary legislation at the bottom of the pile. The Civil Procedure Act is
an Act of Parliament which provides for procedure in Civil Courts. Section
40 thereof makes provision for the arrest and detention of judgment
debtors … To the extent that this Section provides for the arrest and
detention of a judgment-debtor, it is clearly in conflict with Article 11 of
the [ICCPR]. The two are contradictory. This raises several issues. Can the
two provisions co-exist? If so, how can they operate side by side? And if
any cannot co-exist, which of them should take precedence over the other?
In my view, article 11 of the [ICCPR] cannot rank pari passu with the
Constitution. The highest rank it can possibly enjoy is that of an Act of
Parliament. And even if it ranks in parity with an Act of Parliament, it
cannot oust the application of section 40 of the Civil Procedure Act. Nor
for that matter, can it render section 40 unconstitutional. For that reason
for as long as section 40 remains in the statute book, it is not
unconstitutional for a judgment-debtor to be committed to a civil jail upon
his failure to pay his debts. Since, however, section 40 is at variance with
the provisions of an International Convention which is part of the law of
Kenya, it follows that we now have two conflicting laws, none of which is
superior to the other.
Despite the Court holding that international human rights norms were
in parity with national legislation, it failed to adopt the last-in-time
doctrine, as has been adopted in the United States, a doctrine which
would have ensured that the international human rights norms
contained in ICCPR override the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act
due to the fact that ICCPR was incorporated into the Kenyan domestic
legal system at a later date via article 2(6) of the Constitution. An
adoption of the last-in-time doctrine also would have ensured that the
Court does not abdicate its resposibility as the protector of the
fundamental rights in the Constitution by contending as follows:44
In the spirit of the new constitutional order, it is more likely than not that
Kenyans would prefer a system in which there is no threat of civil jails. Until
a decision is taken at a proper forum, section 40 of the Civil Procedure Act
will continue to haunt the liberal freedoms enshrined in the Constitution
until it is repealed or found to be unconstitutional at a proper forum.
The viability of the continued application of this approach in the
interpretation of article 2(6) of the Kenyan Constitution is discussed
more elaborately in part 5 below.
44 As above. This holding by the Court begs the question of which other forum is
better placed to declare the unconstitutionality of legislative provisions that violate
the fundamental rights of individuals and groups than the court itself.
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4 International law in the Colombian domestic legal 
system
Colombia, a country with a similar constitutional provision
incorporating international law directly into the domestic legal
system, provides a different practice to the US in relation to the
applicability of international law in the domestic legal system. Monism
has been entrenched in the Colombian constitutional jurisprudence as
far back as 1914, with the Supreme Court of Colombia insisting that
in instances of conflict between treaty provisions and provisions of
municipal law, treaty provisions prevailed.45 The import of this
decision was affirmed by Nagle who, in his analysis of the decision,
contended that once ratified, international law in treaties were
superior to domestic law and that in instances of conflict, domestic
law had to yield to international law.46 He contended that the import
of the 1914 decision was that ‘the domestic law of Colombia,
including the Constitution, was subject to the terms and conditions of
international treaties’. This is still the prevailing situation after the
adoption of the 1991 Constitution, which in article 93 provides as
follows:
International treaties and agreements ratified by the Congress that
recognize human rights and that prohibit their limitation in states of
emergency have priority domestically.
The rights and duties mentioned in this Charter will be interpreted in
accordance with international treaties on human rights ratified by
Colombia.
An interpretation of article 93 affirming the supremacy of international
human rights law in the Colombian domestic jurisdiction was
delivered in 2010 by the Constitutional Court of Colombia (CCC).47
In its commentary on Decision C-376/10, the International Network
for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net) contends that the
decision is significant as it (the decision) ‘restates that human rights
treaties and comments by [human rights treaty] bodies regarding
45 Challenge to the Constitutionality of Law 14 of 1914, decision of 6 July 1914, 23
Gaceta Judicial (1915), analysed in Gibson (n 2 above) 614-615. 
46 LE Nagle ‘The rule of law or the rule of fear: Some thoughts on Colombian
extradition’ (1991) 13 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law
Journal 862-863
47 Decision C-376/10 (in Spanish) http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/C-376_10_in_
spanish.pdf (accessed 6 April 2013). In arriving at its decision, the Court used a
plethora of international legal instruments such as the Universal Declaration, art
26; ICESCR, art 13; the Protocol of San Salvador, art 13; and ESCR Committee
General Comments 11 & 13; see ESCR Committee Justice, Monthly Case Law
Update ‘Colombian Constitutional Court issues a landmark decision on the right to
education’ (November 2010) http://www.agirpourlesdesc.org/english/esc-rights-
caselaw/article/colombian-constitutional-court (accessed 6 April 2013).
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[SERs] are part of the Colombian legal system and, within it, have a
superior standing compared with the remaining regulations’.48
A further elaboration of this expansive use of international law in
Colombia is exemplified by Decision C-355/2006 of the CCC which
dealt with women’s rights to reproductive health and especially the
right to abortion. In her analysis of this case, Ordolis chronicles the
broad use of international human rights law, and an affirmation by
the Court that since women’s sexual and reproductive rights had been
recognised as human rights under international law, they as such
became part of Colombian constitutional rights.49 She argues that the
Court’s reliance not only on international human rights law
instruments,50 but other soft law instruments,51 enabled it to espouse
a progressive approach to reproductive rights. These instruments
formed the basis for the recognition and protection of women’s
reproductive health rights by the Court.52
Olaya, in analysing the health rights jurisprudence of the CCC,
furthermore contends that the Court has developed the notion of
‘constitutional blocks’ which entails the incorporation of norms,
standards and principles espoused in ratified international human
rights instruments, and even interpretive documents issued by
international human rights-monitoring bodies, when reviewing the
constitutionality of laws or when interpreting fundamental rights.53
This has been affirmed by Chowdhury, who submits that international
human rights treaties ratified by Colombia are at the same level as the
Colombian Constitution with regard to the hierarchy of sources of
law, and that the provisions of ICESCR must be used when
interpreting the relevant articles of the Constitution.54
Taking into account the plain reading of article 2(6) of the 2010
Kenyan Constitution, an interpretation that harmonises national and
international human rights law is possible in the Kenyan context. The
48 ESR-Net ‘Decision C-376/10 of the Colombian Constitutional Court’ http://
www.escr-net.org/caselaw/caselaw_show.htm?doc_id=1407210 (accessed 6 April
2013).
49 E Ordolis ‘Lessons from Colombia: Abortion, equality and constitutional choices’
(2008) 20 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 267.
50 Instruments relied on include the Universal Declaration; ICCPR; ICESCR; CEDAW;
the American Convention on Human Rights; and the Inter-American Convention
on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women
(Convention Belem do Para). See Ordolis (n 49 above) 267.
51 The Court used the definition of reproductive health adopted in the 1994 UN
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD). See Ordolis (n
49 above) 268.
52 Ordolis 68.
53 MA Olaya ‘The right to health as a fundamental and judicially-enforceable right in
Colombia’ (2009) 10 ESR Review 16-17, http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/
clc-projects/socio-economic-rights/esr review (accessed 2 April 2013).
54 J Chowdhury ‘Judicial adherence to a minimum core approach to socio-economic
rights – A comparative perspective’ (2009) Cornell Law School Inter-University
Graduate Student Conference Papers, Paper 27 8, http://scholarship.
law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/27 (accessed 2 April 2013).
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next part of this article thus proposes an interpretation that should be
given to article 2(6) taking into account the two differing practices of
the US and the Colombian domestic systems.
5 Proposed hierarchy of international law in the 
Kenyan legal system
As indicated by the comparative analysis of the US and Colombia
above, countries with constitutional provisions directly incorporating
international human rights law into their domestic legal systems have
adopted varying interpretations of those provisions; with the result
that international human rights law is accorded a different hierarchical
status vis-à-vis domestic law, depending on the interpretation
adopted. As we saw in part 3 above, the US, due to its nationalist
leaning, has progressively given more prominence to its domestic law
at the expense of international human rights law with the adoption of
the self-executing and non-self-executing doctrine to the direct
application of treaties, and has further placed treaties at hierarchically
the same level as domestic legislation. This has led to the application
of the last-in-time doctrine, with the result that the subsequent
instrument supersedes the previous one, be it a self-executing treaty
or domestic legislation. This ‘American exceptionalism’ in relation to
international human rights law norms and standards has generally
detracted from the comprehensive human rights protection and
accountability standards that have been set at the international level,
with the result that the rights of individuals are more easily violated, as
was the case with the rights of the war-on-terror detainees in
Guantanamo Bay.55 It is submitted that, if the international human
rights norms and standards contained in ratified international human
rights treaties are to enhance the protection of the rights and
fundamental freedoms of the Kenyan people, this restricted
application of international human rights law norms should not be
adopted in the Kenyan domestic legal system.
Colombia, on the other hand, as shown in part 4 above, has
chosen to give prominence to international human rights law in its
domestic legal jurisdiction, with some commentators contending that
international human rights law is at the same level as the Colombian
Constitution and that the interpretation of the Constitution must thus
take into account the norms and principles of international human
rights law.56 As a result, the Colombian courts have been more willing
55 The ability of the US approach to erode the protection of rights and fundamental
freedoms is seen in the US’s practice of entering reservations and declarations
during its ratification of ICCPR, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Genocide, the Convention against Torture and the Convention on Racial
Discrimination, to the effect that these important international human rights
instruments were non-self-executing in US domestic law. See Franck &
Thiruvengadam (n 2 above) 473. 
56 See Chowdhury (n 54 above) 8; Nagle (n 46 above) 863.
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to accept international human rights law as a prominent source of
legal obligations, especially in the adjudication of human rights
violations, providing a proper accountability mechanism to ensure
that the political institutions of the state fulfil Colombia’s internal and
external obligations emanating from binding international human
rights law. It is this prominent application of international human
rights law in the domestic legal system that Kenya should aspire to,
and it should thus adopt a progressive interpretation of the
constitutional provisions directly incorporating international law in
Kenya’s domestic legal system in such a manner that international
human rights law can enhance government accountability regarding
the respect, protection, promotion and fulfilment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms at the domestic level.
There are several possibilities of how article 2(6) of the 2010
Constitution can be interpreted so as to accord a prominent status to
international human rights law in the Kenyan domestic jurisdiction.57
Due to time and space constraints, only three of the interpretive
possibilities will be considered in this article: first, an interpretation
that gives international human rights law norms a constitutional
hierarchy; secondly, an interpretation that gives international human
rights law norms an infra-constitutional and infra-legal hierarchy; and
thirdly, an interpretation that gives international human rights law
norms an infra-constitutional but supra-legal hierarchy. 
The first possibility is the interpretation that gives international
human rights law a constitutional hierarchy, that is, an interpretation
placing international human rights law at the same level as the other
constitutional provisions.58 This first possibility is supported by Peters,
who provides two arguments as to why international human rights
law must be placed at the same hierarchical level as the provisions of
57 Even though only these two positions are considered as viable in the Kenyan
context, international law can also have a higher status than all national legislative
Acts, including the Constitution, or it may have an equal hierarchical status to
national legislative Acts, or even have a lower status than both the Constitution
and national legislative Acts. For a discussion of these possibilities, see Viljoen (n 2
above) 525-527.
58 For a comparative argument in support of this proposal, see Danilenko (n 14
above) 64, who submits, taking into account the debate on the interpretation of
art 17 of the Russian Constitution, that international law has the same status as
constitutional provisions in Russia. This is the position in Argentina, whose
Constitution in art 75 also provides clearly that some ratified international treaties
(especially most of the international human rights law treaties) are at the same
level as the Constitution and should be considered as complementary to the rights
in the Constitution. Commenting on art 75 of the Argentinian Constitution, the
UN Housing Rights Programme Report emphasises the importance of giving
international law a prominent role at the national level, especially in the
interpretation, implementation as well as enforcement of fundamental human
rights, and encourages the inclusion of such clauses into the constitutional
frameworks of other countries. See UN Housing Rights Programme Report 1,
Housing rights legislation: Review of international and national legal instruments
(2002) 39-40, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HousingRightsen.
pdf (accessed 19 April 2013). See also Franck & Thiruvengadam (n 2 above) 513-
514; Torrijo (n 26 above) 491.
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national constitutions. First, she argues for the abandoning of a formal
hierarchy between constitutional provisions and international human
rights law provisions by stating that, due to the increasing
permeability and convergence of state constitutions (constitutional
cross-pollination) resulting in vertical and horizontal harmonisation
(that is, with international law and with other state constitutions
respectively), it matters little whether a court applies a domestic
fundamental right or an international human rights provision, because
both sets of norms tend to acquire the same content and scope.59
She thus calls for the adoption of a ‘substance-oriented perspective’
where norms are ranked in accordance with their substantive weight
and significance, with less significant state constitutional provisions
giving way to important international human rights norms in
instances of conflict.60 Second, she argues that ‘[i]n a strictly legal
positivist and schematic perspective, a hierarchically inferior norm
cannot have an impact on the reading of a higher norm’.61 She
contends that in accordance with this understanding, the idea of the
supremacy of domestic constitutional law over international law is
irreconcilable with the requirement that national constitutions must
be interpreted in conformity with international human rights law.62
Therefore, for international human rights law to have the desired
effect and impact on the development of national constitutional and
domestic law, it must of necessity be ranked at the same level as
constitutional provisions. 
An argument adopting this first approach was advanced by a
petitioner and adopted by the High Court of Kenya in Re – The Matter
59 Peters (n 14 above) 197. This is the doctrine espoused by the universalist model of
constitutional interpretation through the use of comparative international and
foreign law sources, which provides that constitutional guarantees are cut from a
universal cloth and constitutional interpretation is an engagement in the
identification, construction and application of the same set of principles. See
Choudhry (n 29 above) 833; DM Beatty ‘Law and politics’ (1996) 44 American
Journal of Comparative Law 131; RF Oppong ‘Re-imagining international law: An
examination of recent trends in the reception of international law into national
legal systems in Africa’ (2007) 30 Fordham International Law Journal 299, who
argues that with the convergence of interests protected by both national and
international law, that is, the securing of the well-being of individuals, it is
practically inappropriate to isolate national and international law; and
C L'Heureux-Dube ‘The importance of dialogue: Globalisation and the
international impact of the Rehnquist Court’ (1998-1999) 34 Tulsa Law Journal 24,
who avers that since human rights law, national and international, is cut from the
same cloth and is drawn from similar earlier documents, it makes sense for judges
to engage with the expertise, experience and reasoning of interpreters of similar
documents from other jurisdictions. 
60 Peters (n 14 above) 197.
61 Peters (n 14 above) 181.
62 Peters 177-178. She gives the examples of the 1976 Portuguese Constitution, art
16(2); the 1978 Spanish Constitution, art 10(2); and the 1991 Romanian
Constitution, art 20(1), as those constitutions which require that their provisions
are interpreted in conformity with international law. See also K Young Constituting
economic and social rights (2012) 23, who similarly contends that domestic
constitutional rights must be interpreted compatibly with international human
rights law.
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of Zipporah Wambui Mathara.63 The petitioners argued that article 2,
of which article 2(6) is a part, not only provides for the supremacy of
the Constitution, but also provides for the hierarchy and sources of
law in Kenya, thus incorporating international treaties ratified by
Kenya into the Kenyan domestic system as sources of law.64 The
petitioners went on to argue that, due to the hierarchy of laws created
under article 2, the Constitution with its incorporation of ratified
international law treaties as sources of law in Kenya was supreme, and
that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act, which permitted the
committal of civil debtors to jail, were against the spirit of the
Constitution and of international human rights law as contained in
article 11 of ICCPR.65 In deciding the case, the Court held as
follows:66
Principally I agree with counsel for the Debtor that by virtue of the
provisions of Section 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, International
Treaties and Conventions that Kenya has ratified are imported as part of the
sources of the Kenyan Law. Thus the provision of Article 11 of the [ICCPR]
which Kenya ratified on 1st May 1972 is part of the Kenyan law. This
covenant makes provision for the promotion and protection of human
rights and recognises that individuals are entitled to basic freedoms to seek
ways and means of bettering themselves. It obviously goes without saying
that a party who is deprived of their basic freedom by way of enforcement
of a civil debt through imprisonment, their ability to move and even seek
ways and means of repaying the debt is curtailed … An order of
imprisonment in civil jail is meant to punish, humiliate and subject the
debtor to shame and indignity due to failure to pay a civil debt. That goes
against the [ICCPR] that guarantee parties basic freedoms of movement
and of pursuing economic social and cultural development.
In this case, the Court gave constitutional force to international
human rights law norms contained in ratified international human
rights treaties as per article 2(6) of the Constitution, a reading of the
Mathara case that was affirmed by the High Court in the case of
Beatrice Wanjiku & Another v The Attorney-General & Another as
follows:67
Justice Koome seemed to suggest that the provisions of the Civil Procedure
Act and Rules were subject to ICCPR and that they could be invalidated on
that basis that they were inconsistent with its provisions.
A similar argument on the constitutional hierarchy of ratified
international human rights law norms was also made by the Centre
for Multi-Party Democracy (CMD) and other interested parties in the
Supreme Court of Kenya in relation to the interpretation of the one-
third gender rule entrenched in articles 27(6) and 27(8) of the 2010
Kenyan Constitution.68 Although the Supreme Court went ahead to
rely on international human rights law norms in both the majority
63 Mathara (n 16 above).
64 Mathara para 3.
65 Mathara para 4.
66 Mathara paras 9-10.
67 Beatrice Wanjiku & Another v The Attorney-General (n 18 above) para 15.
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opinion and the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice, they did not
make any pronouncement with regard to the hierarchical place of
international human rights law in the Kenyan domestic legal system.
Despite the illuminating arguments by Peters, the High Court
pronouncement in the Mathara case and the proposition by CMD
that international human rights law norms have constitutional force in
Kenya due to their constitutional entrenchment in article 2(6), the
interpretation placing international human rights law at the same
hierarchical status as the constitutional provisions may not be very
viable in the Kenyan domestic legal system due to the supremacy
clause of the Constitution, as is shown more elaborately in the
discussion of the third possibility of interpretation below.
The second possible interpretation is that of placing international
human rights law norms at an infra-constitutional and infra-legal
hierarchical position, that is, human rights norms in ratified
international treaties being below both constitutional norms and
national legislation. This is the approach that was adopted in the
Kenyan High Court case of Beatrice Wanjiku & Another v The Attorney-
General & Another as follows:69
I take the position that the use of the phrase ‘under this Constitution’ as
used in Article 2(6) means that the international conventions and treaties
are ‘subordinate’ to and ought to be in compliance with the Constitution.
Although it is generally expected that the government through its
executive ratifies international instruments in good faith on the behalf of
and in the best interests of the citizens, I do not think the framers of the
Constitution would have intended that international conventions and
treaties should be superior to local legislation and take precedence over
laws enacted by their chosen representatives under the provisions of Article
94. Article 1 places a premium on the sovereignty of the people to be
exercised through democratically elected representatives and a contrary
interpretation would put the executive in a position where it directly usurps
legislative authority through treaties thereby undermining the doctrine of
separation of powers which is part of our Constitutional set up.
The view adopted by the judge in the Wanjiku case above is per
incuriam as it is not supported by the judge’s engagement with any
comparative national or international judicial jurisprudence or based
on the writings of any national or international commentator on the
hierarchy of international human rights law in national jurisdictions.
Reliance on the sovereignty of the people argument in article 1 of the
Constitution has also been overtaken by events and cannot stand due
to the adoption of the Treaty-Making and Ratification Act, 2012,
which provides a clear role for parliament as well as the people
generally, though the requirement of public participation in the treaty
68 In the Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation in the National Assembly and
the Senate, Supreme Court of Kenya, Advisory Opinion Application 2 of 2012,
para 42; Dissenting Opinion of the Chief Justice Willy Mutunga (n 20 above) paras
5.7-5.8.
69 Beatrice Wanjiku & Another v The Attorney-General (n 18 above) para 20. 
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ratification process, to oversee the ratification of treaties, as is
discussed more elaborately below. 
It is submitted here that the adoption of this approach does not
change the position and the function of international human rights
law norms as was envisaged by the drafters of the 2010
Constitution.70 In fact, it provides for retrogressive application of
international human rights law in the Kenyan domestic legal system
as, prior to the adoption of the 2010 Constitution, ratified and
domesticated international human rights treaties shared a similar
hierarchical status to national legislation, and not a lower status as is
envisaged by the Court’s infra-legislative interpretation in the Wanjiku
case.71 The protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
enshrined in international human rights norms is the basic minimum
protection that should be accorded to human beings if they are to live
as human beings. International human rights law envisages and does
not prohibit higher standards of human rights protection that are
adopted at national levels for the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms of individuals and groups. What it prohibits is
the adoption of national legislative and other measures that detract
from the basic protection that should be accorded to individuals and
groups at the national level. States are thus not limited by
international human rights standards if they want to adopt more
progressive protective national measures for the realisation of human
rights. In adopting an interpretation that places international human
rights norms contained in ratified international human rights treaties
at a hierarchically-lower position than national legislation, the judge in
the Wanjiku case permits the legislative adoption of retrogressive
national measures that go below the basic level of human rights
protection espoused in international human rights law. This standard,
which is lower than the restrictive standard adopted in the US, a state
which places international human rights law at the same level as
national legislation, should not be adopted in Kenya as it has the
potential to lower the standard of protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms envisaged in the 2010 Constitution.
The third possibility, and which is the favoured interpretive choice
in this article, is an interpretation that gives international law a
hierarchical status slightly lower than the constitutional provisions, but
70 For arguments on the importance of international human rights law in the Kenyan
domestic legal system, see the arguments in the texts accompanying nn 87-91
below.
71 See D Shelton ‘Introduction’ in D Shelton (ed) International law and domestic legal
systems: Incorporation, transformation and persuasion (2011) 5, who affirms that
most dualist common law states, as Kenya was prior to the enactment of the 2010
Constitution, generally rank ratified treaties as equivalent to domestic legislation.
See also Franck & Thiruvengadam (n 2 above) 476 477-478, who affirm, in
relation to Germany, that since incorporation of international treaties in Germany
takes place through federal legislation, treaties in German law are equivalent in
rank to federal statutes. They further note that despite this equality of rank, the
courts in Germany and Italy have in practice purposed to uphold treaties even in
instances of contradictory subsequent federal legislation.
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superior to domestic legislation (infra-constitutional but supra-legal
hierarchy) in the new constitutional dispensation.72 This is due to the
supremacy clause in the 2010 Constitution which not only provides in
article 2(1) that it is the supreme law of the land binding on all
persons and all state organs, but also provides that its validity is not
subject to any challenge, and that any other law, custom, act or
omission inconsistent with the Constitution is void to the extent of the
inconsistency, as per articles 2(3) and (4).73 It is submitted that,
taking into account a holistic reading of article 2 of the Constitution,
in incorporating international law as part of Kenyan law in article 2(6)
within the supremacy clause, the drafters intended that international
law, as long as it is consistent with the purport, spirit and the
provisions of the Constitution,74 should have a prominent place in the
Kenyan domestic legal system.
The requirement that international law contained in treaties must
be compatible with the Constitution if they are to have direct
application in the Kenyan domestic legal system can be drawn from
article 2(6) itself, which provides that treaties form part of the laws of
Kenya ‘under this Constitution’. The phrase ‘under this Constitution’
can be interpreted as a requirement that a proper constitutional
analysis be undertaken before the ratification of a treaty to ensure that
it is in compliance with the Constitution and that the processes
leading to the ratification of a treaty must be accomplished in
accordance with the Constitution.75 This interpretation is supported
by the arguments of Korenica and Doli who, writing in the context of
72 See T Kabau & C Njoroge ‘The application of international law in Kenya under the
2010 Constitution: Critical issues in the harmonisation of the legal system’ (2011)
44 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 302-303. Some of
the comparative jurisdictions that have an infraconstitutional but supralegal
hierarchy of international law vis-à-vis domestic legislation include France (as well
as the francophone African countries who have directly replicated art 55 of the
1958 French Constitution), Japan, China, Albania and Cape Verde. The
jurisdictions in which international law and domestic legislation have equal status
include the US, Germany, Italy and India. For an elaborate discussion of these
jurisdictions, see Frank & Thiruvengadam (n 2 above) 471-489; Viljoen (n 2
above) 518-522; Killander & Adjolohoun (n 2 above) 5-7; Oppong (n 59 above)
322-323; and F Korenika & D Doli ‘The relationship between international treaties
and domestic law: A view from Albanian constitutional law and practice’ (2012)
24 Pace International Law Review 103.
73 Kabau & Njoroge (n 72 above) 294 298-300.
74 See eg JH Jackson ‘Status of treaties in domestic legal systems: A policy analysis’
(1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 317, who contends that there is a
possibility that a treaty binding under international law may be invalid under the
constitution of a state if it conflicts with the provisions of the domestic
constitution. In such instances, the treaty cannot have a direct application and will
be invalid to the extent of its inconsistency with the domestic constitution. He
further argues that for the issue of the hierarchy of norms to surface in relation to
treaty law, it must first be determined that the treaty is valid both internationally
and domestically (not inconsistent with the constitution), must be directly
applicable (reliance on the treaty provisions by the courts and other government
institutions as a source of law) as well as invocable by parties in litigation (318).
75 See Beatrice Wanjiku & Another v The Attorney-General (n 18 above) para 20, where
the Court held that ‘the phrase “under this Constitution” as used in article 2(6)
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the Albanian Constitution, contend that for treaties to have direct
application, they must be constitutional, and that an a priori process
of analysis of the constitutionality of the treaty is undertaken by the
Albanian Constitutional Court before the ratification of the treaty in
question.76 Although the 2010 Kenyan Constitution has no express
provision requiring a priori review of treaties for constitutionality, a
similar procedure has been developed through the adoption of the
Treaty-Making and Ratification Act 45 of 2012, an Act of Parliament
adopted to give effect to article 2(6) of the Constitution in relation to
the procedure for the making and ratification of treaties.77 The Act
entrusts the general responsibility for the initiation, negotiation and
ratification of treaties on the executive arm of government.78 The Act
in Part III envisions the a priori approval by both the cabinet and
parliament before a treaty is ratified, requiring the drafting of a
memorandum to the cabinet, and subsequently to parliament after
the approval of the cabinet, on the objectives and the subject matter
of the treaty.79 The memorandum submitted to the cabinet and
subsequently to parliament must contain a detailed explanation of the
following important requirements:80
(a) the objects and subject matter of the treaty;
(b) any constitutional implications including -
(i) any proposed amendment to the Constitution; and
(ii) that the treaty is consistent with the Constitution and promotes
constitutional values and objectives;
(c) the national interests which may be affected by the ratification of the
treaty;
(d) obligations imposed on Kenya by the treaty;
(e) requirements for implementation of the treaty;
(f) policy and legislative considerations;
(g) financial implications;
(h) ministerial responsibility;
(i) implications on matters relating to counties;
(j) the summary of the process leading to the adoption of the treaty;
(k) the date of signature;
(l) the number of states that are party to the treaty;
(m) the views of the public on the ratification of the treaty;
(n) whether the treaty sought to be ratified permits reservations and any
recommendations on reservations and declarations;
(o) the proposed text of any reservations that should be entered when
ratifying the treaty in order to protect or advance national interests or
ensure conformity with the Constitution; and
(p) whether expenditure of public funds will be incurred in implementing
the treaty and an estimate, where possible, of the expenditure.
The Act further requires public participation in the ratification of
treaties, demanding that the relevant parliamentary committees
75 means that the international conventions and treaties are “subordinate” to and
ought to be in compliance with the Constitution’.
76 Korenika & Doli (n 72 above) 110-117.
77 http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads (accessed 5 October 2013).
78 The Treaty Making and Ratification Act, Part II, secs 4-6. 
79 The Treaty Making and Ratification Act, secs 7-9.
80 The Treaty Making and Ratification Act, sec 7.
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involve the public in the ratification process in accordance with the
laid-down parliamentary procedures.81 It requires parliament not to
approve the ratification of any treaty which is contrary to the
Constitution or any reservations to a treaty which negate any of the
provisions of the Constitution.82 The Act also places these safeguards
when the state is seeking to denounce or withdraw from a treaty.83
The practice of a priori review of the constitutionality of a treaty by the
legislature has taken root in many of the countries with constitutional
provisions requiring the direct incorporation of ratified treaties into
the domestic legal system, such as in Namibia,84 the US, Germany,
Italy, Japan, France, China85 and Colombia.86
The direct application of international human rights law in the
Kenyan domestic legal system, together with the proposal that
international human rights law norms should have a supra-legal status
in Kenya, are aimed at ensuring that important democratic
governance standards as well as human rights and fundamental
freedoms contained in international law are sufficiently entrenched in
the Kenyan domestic legal system, and are not left to the whims of
the ruling majority of the day to change at their own convenience
through legislative amendments.87 This reasoning is supported by the
2010 Constitution in articles 255 to 257, which pinpoint the
supremacy clause as one of the clauses that can only be changed
through a referendum, and not by a simple majority in parliament. In
this way, the drafters of the Constitution intended to safeguard the
democratic and fundamental rights protection gains that were won in
the struggle for constitutional change and to preclude a relapse to
totalitarian rule.88 Slaughter and Burke-White outline some of the
ways in which international human rights law can enhance
democratic governance and improve the respect for as well as the
81 The Treaty Making and Ratification Act, sec 8(3).
82 Sec 8(9).
83 Sec 17.
84 The 1990 Namibian Constitution, art 63(2)(e), which provides that ‘[t]he National
Assembly of Namibia shall agree to the ratification of or accession to international
agreements which have been negotiated and signed in terms of article 32(3)(e)
hereof’. This article has been interpreted as requiring that for international law
contained in treaties to be binding on Namibia externally and internally, it must
be approved by parliament. See Tshosha (n 13 above) 19-21.
85 See Frank & Thiruvengadam (n 2 above) 471-489.
86 See Nagle (n 46 above) 859-861.
87 The importance of a strong incorporation of international law in the domestic
legal system is also affirmed in the context of Russia, where it is argued that it is a
part of a general policy of enhancing the rule of law, democracy and the respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms. See Franck & Thiruvengadam (n 2
above) 506-507.
88 Torrijo (n 26 above) 491, who avers that ‘[d]omestic legislation should not be
allowed to untie what has been tied through the incorporation of international
law into domestic law’, and that to achieve this, international law should be
placed beyond the reach of domestic law; Jackson (n 74 above) 322-323 331. He
contends that ‘[i]f citizens of a nation have a higher degree of trust in the
international institutions and treaties than they do in their own governmental
structures, they will prefer [directly applicable international norms with higher
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protection of human rights, which include the following:89 First, it
helps in the strengthening of domestic institutions through the
formalisation and inclusion of ‘government networks’ as mechanisms
of global governance so as to enhance accountability and
effectiveness at the national level; secondly, it provides a mechanism
for the backstopping of national governments in instances of their
unwillingness or failure to act through international law rules and
principles such as the international criminal law duty to prosecute or
extradite (aut dedere aut judicare), the complementarity principle
enshrined in the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court, as well as the requirement that national remedies be available
and effective for the principle of the exhaustion of local remedies to
be applicable in filing individual communications in international
treaty-monitoring bodies;90 and, thirdly, it can serve as a mechanism
for the compelling of national governments to act to address new
transnational threats through the enactment of national legislation
domestically criminalising certain transnational acts such as terrorism,
money laundering and piracy.91
Therefore Kenya, in its effort to respect, protect, promote and fulfil
the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the people, must not
only take into account its constitutional human rights obligations, but
must also enforce its international human rights obligations as
entrenched in ratified international legal instruments. Kenyan courts
are thus under an obligation to take judicial notice of international
human rights norms in ratified treaties as legitimate and prominent
sources of law in the Kenyan domestic jurisdiction. As Kenya already
has an extensive constitutionally-entrenched catalogue of human
rights based on generally-recognised international human rights
standards, the practice should be that in litigation for the vindication
of human rights violations, the litigants should primarily premise their
88 status than national legislative norms] as a conscious or implicit check on their
government. Thus, it is entirely understandable that some persons in recently
autocratic countries might favour an international regime to protect human rights’
(332). This adequately summarises the Kenyan situation and supports the
constitutionalisation as well as the prominent status given to international law in
the 2010 Constitution. See also D Shelton (n 71 above) 2, who affirms that due to
the post-war emphasis on human rights and democratic governance, international
law has been given a prominent status in domestic legal jurisdictions as a form of
‘international safety net’.
89 AM Slaughter & W Burke-White ‘The future of international law is domestic (or
the European way of law)’ (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 333-346.
90 The importance of the backstopping role is twofold: first, to provide a second line
of defence when national institutions fail and, secondly, the ability of the
international process to catalyse action at the national level. See Slaughter &
Burke-White (n 89 above) 341-342.
91 A case in point is the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373; the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; and
the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, which, in
an effort to combat global terrorism, require states to enact legislation
criminalising the financing of terrorism, the freezing of terrorists’ assets by
national authorities and the use of domestic courts to bring to justice individuals
involved in terrorist acts. See Slaughter & Burke-White (n 89 above) 344-345.
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case on the constitutional provisions relevant to their case, and should
only use international human rights law to support their arguments
based on the violation of their constitutional rights. In adjudicating on
such cases, courts must take into account the relevant international
human rights law provisions as well as the relevant interpretive
devices that have been developed in relation to the relevant
international human rights law norms, such as the general comments
of the relevant treaty bodies, international guidelines dealing with the
issue at hand, and other soft law materials from the relevant
international treaty bodies.92 This will ensure that there is a
harmonised development of the entrenched constitutional rights in
line with international human rights law, as well as an enhanced
fulfilment of both the constitutional and the international human
rights obligations of the state. However, in instances of a real gap in
the domestic constitutional provisions, international human rights law
norms should be applied directly to cover the deficit. 
In the interpretation of domestic legislative Acts, taking into
account the superior hierarchical status of international human rights
law vis-à-vis domestic legislation as proposed above, the courts must
interpret domestic legislation to ensure their conformity with
international human rights law. As such, in instances of a conflict
between national domestic legislation and international human rights
law norms, the courts should resort to the use of the Charming Betsy
doctrine of constitutional interpretation, discussed in part 3 note 42
above, and interpret the domestic legislation, as far as possible, to
conform to international human rights standards, failing which
international human rights law norms should triumph.93
6 Conclusion
Prior to the promulgation of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, the use of
international law in the Kenyan domestic legal jurisdiction was limited
as Kenya followed the dualist system of transformation of treaties into
the domestic legal system through the enactment of domesticating
92 See Kabau & Njoroge (n 72 above) 300-301; Danilenko (n 14 above) 62.
93 The Kenyan courts can also benefit from the experience of the Russian
Constitutional Court in its use of international law in the interpretation of
constitutional and other domestic laws, such as Case Concerning Certain Normative
Acts of the City of Moscow and Some Other Regions, VKS 1996 2 42, where the
Court held that art 17 of the 1993 Russian Constitution recognises and guarantees
human rights in accordance with the general principles and norms of international
law, and emphasised that the right to freedom of movement is not only
guaranteed by the Constitution, but also by ICCPR, art 12, and other international
human rights instruments, including art 2 of Protocol 4 to the European
Convention on Human Rights. For more such Russian cases, see Danilenko (n 14
above) 57-59 68; GM Danilenko ‘The new Russian Constitution and international
law’ (1994) 88 American Journal of International Law 451; J Henderson ‘Reference
to international law in decided cases of the first Russian Constitutional Court’ in
R Mullerson et al (eds) Constitutional reforms and international law in Central and
Eastern Europe (1998) 59.
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legislation. However, with the promulgation of the Constitution, the
system of transformation has been replaced by a system of direct
incorporation, where international human rights law norms in ratified
treaties are expected to form an integral part of sources of law in
Kenya as per article 2(6) of the Constitution. 
This article has proposed that, in order to give international human
rights law a prominent place in the Kenyan legal system and to ensure
domestic accountability for the realisation of Kenya’s international
human rights obligations, article 2(6) of the Constitution must be
interpreted in a progressive manner to give international human rights
law a higher status hierarchically as compared to domestic legislative
Acts. To achieve this, it has been proposed that Kenya adopts an
interpretation that accords international human rights law norms an
infra-constitutional but supra-legal hierarchical status in the Kenyan
domestic system. This will mean that, for international human rights
law to be applicable directly in the Kenyan domestic jurisdiction, it
must be compatible with the Constitution, which is the supreme law
of the land. In relation to the interpretation of national legislative Acts,
the proposal that international human rights law norms be accorded a
supra-legal status means that international human rights law will be
superior to these national legislative Acts, and that should there be
any irreconcilable conflict between them, international human rights
law norms would prevail. In this way, the human rights and
fundamental freedoms as well as the democratic and good
governance standards enshrined in international human rights law will
be safeguarded from the whims of the prevailing parliamentary
majorities, with a strong international human rights law buffer to
guard against relapse to totalitarian rule.94 This approach is envisaged
by the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, especially article 20(2), which
provides for the enjoyment of rights in the Constitution to the
greatest extent consistent with the nature of the rights. It is further
buttressed by article 20(3)(b), which calls for the adoption of an
interpretation that most favours the enforcement of rights.95 
94 Hongju-Koh (n 25 above) 53; E Benvenisti ‘Reclaiming democracy: The strategic
use of foreign and international law by national courts’ (2008) 102 American
Journal of International Law 242; Peters (n 14 above) 173-174. She argues that the
reception of international standards, such as human rights protection, good
governance and democracy, into national constitutions leads to the vertical
convergence of constitutional and international law; that is ‘the globalisation of
state constitutions and the constitutionalisation of international law’. 
95 See also the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, art 259(1), which calls for the
construction of the provisions of the Constitution in a manner that promotes its
purposes, values and principles; advances the rule of law and the fundamental
rights in the Bill of Rights; permits the development of law; and contributes to
good governance.
